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In her contribution, Barbara Prainsack invites us to reflect upon often-neglected facets of 
contemporary visions of personalized medicine, which emphasize less the power of genomics to give 
room to other, non-genetic information with potentially higher levels of actionability. From social 
media data, to wearable sensors, or even consumption patterns, the path towards data-intensive, 
individualized medicine is not only paved by the explanatory promises of molecular and systems 
biology, but heavily draws upon categories of data traditionally not associated to medicine, which 
could yet prove fundamental in the development of monitoring and prevention strategies. As the 
author rightly points out – also through the mobilization of the narrative scenario of the novel The 
Circle – the future depicted by the use of these data is no less controversial than the one in which 
genomics plays the role of the “soloist” (p.4).  
In particular, two assumptions behind big data medicine catch the concerned reflection of 
Prainsack. On the one hand, what could be called the moral suasion of citizens with regard to their 
alleged duties to collect and share more data, according to which those who do not contribute with 
their own data should actually be blamed of hampering the achievement of the societal good of a 
better medicine. In the author’s view, this line of reasoning is fundamentally flawed in that it puts on 
a par the responsibilities and accountability of those who would actually control data (e.g. biobanks, 
public agencies, hospitals, or even private companies), and those who instead could both benefit and 
be harmed by their use. A patient and a network of biobanks pooling data, a citizen and a company 
marketing genetic testing direct-to-consumer – Prainsack argues – are social actors whose duties and 
obligations with regard to the sharing and controlling of data are not the same. Thus, any general call 
of duty to share and made accessible health data should take into consideration the imbalances of 
power currently existing in medicine, and devise effective collective strategies to protect the privacy 
of individual citizens. On the other hand, Prainsack’s critique goes at the techno-epistemic core of 
the big data paradigm in biomedicine. The urge to share data in the discursive representations of 
personalized medicine often brushes over the concrete challenges of making data interoperable, and 
over the potential gains in terms of medically actionable information that could be obtained from data 
integration. Little is known, to this moment, about whether connecting heterogeneous datasets in 
medicine is an effort worth the huge investments it demands, or about the effective meaning and 
clinical benefits that could be obtained through this process.  
Starting from this two-fold critique of personalized medicine, Prainsack argues for the need 
to innovate democratically this paradigm through social and political developments grounded on the 
normative framework of solidarity. In the understanding of its proponents (Prainsack and Buyx 2011), 
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solidarity can be defined as the “shared practices reflecting a collective commitment to carry ‘costs’ 
(financial, social, emotional or otherwise) to assist others”. Solidaristic acts and practices are, in other 
words, not only individual expressions of sympathy towards others’ vulnerability in which we 
recognize our own. Quite the contrary, solidarity often manifests itself in the form of solidified social 
norms and structures (e.g. welfare systems and social welfare arrangements) that represent an explicit 
societal commitment to assist others at a nominal cost for each member of a society. For this reason, 
this concept may prove – according to the author – useful to account for the social and political 
challenges raised by personalized medicine. First, normative exercises of the solidarity principle 
could point to the need of bringing the personal and collective levels together in the context of big 
data medicine, by pointing to the fact that self-interested and other-regarding actions are indeed not 
mutually exclusive in this context (data that are useful to one patient can be useful also for the 
conditions afflicting another). Second, solidarity may highlight the multiple ways in which sharing 
one’s data constitutes also a contribution to the achievement of collective goods. Third, solidarity-
based approaches could also remind us that stratification should not lead to undue exclusion and 
should instead be driven by distributive considerations of benefit-sharing. Fourth, another important 
consideration stemming from the principle of solidarity has to do with questions of access, and the 
imperative to ensure that people facing projects of big data medicine are not left alone should they 
decide not, or be unable to partake to these endeavours (Prainsack and Buyx 2017). 
 In our commentary, we focus on both the moral and the epistemic aspects of the critique 
presented by Prainsack, and complement her proposal with an emphasis on the relevance and value 
of practical experimentations with solidarity in personalized medicine that are both moral and techno-
epistemic. As to the former, our objective is to complement her diagnosis on (what could be called) 
the moral economy (Fassin 2009) of personalized medicine with a reflection upon the role of 
solidarity-based engagements and moral practices to counter the dystopia furthered through this 
paradigm. As to the latter, instead, our goal is to show how working towards interoperability of data 
responds to distinct epistemic and technoscientific objectives of biomedical actors, some of which 
can arguably be characterized as going in the direction of furthering solidarity-sensitive practices in 
our societies through personalized medicine.  
Moral economies are unstable systems 
In the book At the Heart of the State, Didier Fassin and his colleagues explore what they call the 
moral world of institutions (Fassin et al. 2015). Drawing from ethnographic studies of different 
institutional settings – from courts, to the police, to employment centres – the authors present us with 
vivid reportages of the lived experiences and moral functioning of various services in our societies. 
Following the work of practitioners in these different contexts allows them revealing how institutions 
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are “the site where the state is produced” (p.6); namely, how the “macro-sociological and the micro-
sociological levels” (p.7) of state apparatuses are held together through the daily work, moral 
engagements, negotiations and relations of individual and collective agents working (for) them. 
Institutions are, in other words, the locus where the structure of a civic, legislative and regulatory 
framework unfolds into and is (re)produced by habits, judgements, sentiments, punishments – in one 
word, morals – of individual and collective subjects. In order to capture these two intertwining levels 
of institution-making the authors employ a distinction between moral economies and moral 
subjectivities. The former designate “the production, circulation and appropriation of values and 
affects regarding a given social issue” in a specific polity, at a given historical moment (Fassin et al. 
2015, p.9; Fassin 2009). Roughly put, they constitute a common substantive understanding of the 
place, role and evaluation of actors gravitating around a given social issue: they provide general 
institutional positionings, they orient public sentiments and attitudes, and instruct individual and 
collective judgements of the situation. Moral subjectivities, by contrast, are instead the “processes by 
which individuals develop ethical practices in their relationships with themselves or others” (Fassin 
et al. 2015, p.9). They pertain to the level of the moral work involving individuals and collectives at 
the micro-level of routine activities in institutional settings, and typically consist of the moral tensions 
in the practice of turning the injunctions stemming from substantive representations of an issue (i.e. 
its moral economy) into embodied agency.  
In this respect, moral subjectivities illustrate the lived body of a moral system: individual 
hesitations and pondering are the vivid solidification of the moral complexity of a situation, often 
neglected in its discursive and institutional representation. At the same time, however, moral 
subjectivities reveal also how agency is irreducible to the economy of sentiments, norms and 
principles giving meaning and value to a social phenomenon. The autonomy of agents to deviate from 
their professional ethos in order to lend a gesture of care, the decision to enforce more softly a given 
rule in the face of a particular situation, all testify of the generative power of subjective motivations, 
sentiments and relations in the face of an existing moral economy. In doing so, their book offers an 
in-depth demonstration of how moral economies are fundamentally unstable systems. Although 
providing the substantive framing of a certain matter in our societies, their existence in the social 
space necessitates the composing, decomposing and recomposing of their tenets by the concerned 
actors. This recognition, we argue, offers the opportunity for at least two reflections concerning 
Prainsack’s socio-political uptake of the nascent paradigm of personalized medicine. 
First, acknowledging the complex morality of institutional functioning suggests that – 
although the concerns expressed by the author about personalized medicine are cogent – they belong 
to its moral economy, thus leaving open the possibility that relations, duties, care and reciprocal 
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obligations in given settings and situations may be otherwise. This is not meant to deny that the idea 
behind this data-intensive type of medicine can arguably be characterized as constituting a de-
personalization of medicine, reducing the individual patient to a mere digital representation stripped 
of its complex social belonging and existential complexity (Zwart 2016). Nor to mitigate the parallel 
critique showing how personalization as coveted medical reality often goes hand in hand with a 
problematic rhetoric of empowerment conceiving a devolution of responsibility to the citizenry with 
regard to their health (Juengst, Flatt, and Settersten 2012; cf. Prainsack 2017). Nor, finally, it is an 
exercise of wishful thinking denying the importance of hypes, programmatic visions, soft regulations, 
policy visions and biomedical in the practical unfolding of innovation (Hedgecoe 2004). Rather, what 
we mean here is to highlight the gap between some claims made to support the vision of personalized 
medicine and the complexities faced by the subjectivities working on the transformation of 
personalization into a reality of medicine. If we hold this distinction, we can see that the future is not 
given, that the problematic social circulation of particular technologies of monitoring and data 
brokering is not inevitable, that the moral fabric of personalized medicine is, in large part, still to be 
made. By holding a methodological distinction between moral economies and subjecties, we do not 
have to accept the dystopic version of personalised medicine criticized by Prainsack, mostly because 
the realization of this paradigm is still open, is still undecided: too many competing values, 
sentiments, desires, expectations (are likely to) play a fundamental role in the practical configurations 
this vision of medicine is going to engender.  
Against this backdrop, Prainsack’s work constitutes an important starting point. Her call for 
solidarity-based arrangements that could innovate democratically the domain of healthcare has the 
merit of highlighting alternative views of the moral economy of personalized medicine, which could 
instruct regulations genuinely serving the interests of public health. Yet, these views alone run the 
risk of obliterating the subjectivities currently experimenting with the moral economy of personalized 
medicine, which – as we have seen in the example of Fassin and his colleagues – cannot be reduced 
to the simple reproduction of the moral suasions and concealed disempowerment of citizens with 
regard to their health detectable at a discursive level. The ‘moral world of personalized medicine’ – 
if we wanted to paraphrase these authors – may rather be defined by the substantive tension between 
generative practices and structuring discourses. 
This leads us to a second reflection, which pertains to the strategies to further Prainsack’s 
normative proposal in the nascent socio-political configurations of future medicine. What role could 
solidaristic practices that may be currently part of the daily, mundane work of experimenting with 
the paradigm of personalized medicine play in the promotion of her solidarity-based moral economy 
of future healthcare? As shown by (Hoeyer, Tupasela, and Rasmussen 2017) in the context of an 
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international collaborative project, the material and informational flow of biomedical research often 
demands a type of moral engagement on the side of researchers that goes beyond the principles and 
regulations norming their professional practice. While the latter, as the authors show, are very useful 
to inform researchers about what they are allowed to do, it is rather through the “morality built into 
ties between people” (Hoeyer, Tupasela, and Rasmussen 2017, p.393) that research collaborations 
among scientists and donors are kept flowing. This recognition goes in the direction of the distinction 
we have drawn from Fassin and colleagues between moral economies and subjectivities, and suggests 
that the same may currently be happening with regard to solidarity. Regardless of whether this 
principle is integral or foreign to the moral economy of personalized in a given socio-political setting, 
solidarity could be seen – in this vein – as one among other values that is being negotiated in the daily 
subjective work of researchers experimenting with personalization. And, indeed, some evidence to 
support this view may be found in the literature. From the decision to implement institutional policies 
for data restitution in genomic research that take into consideration vulnerable (biological) relatives 
of sample donors although not required by current legislation (Hens et al. 2011), to the development 
of alternative models of informed consent that deviate from the gold standard of general consent to 
give more room to patient participation and partnerships between them and the researchers (Blasimme 
and Vayena 2016), we have reasons to think that solidaristic practices are already part and parcel of 
the moral world of personalized medicine. This posits the opportunity of a thoroughly complementary 
strategy for the promotion of Prainsack’s proposal, and one that methodologically starts from a 
problematization of the hiatus between the complexity of moral practices and the economies of values 
that guide biomedicine. Ultimately, the importance of promoting solidarity-based arrangements in 
personalized medicine is a strong political argument for Prainsack, which – at the same time – may 
be a very practical concern for researchers and practitioners currently working on the translation of 
personalization into a medical reality. What if, then, we needed more to generalize moral subjective 
experimentations with solidarity than to promote it as a principle in personalized medicine? To 
rephrase Bernard Williams’ critique of Kantian moral philosophy, future patients may need the 
benefits of human gestures of solidarity, not the benefits of its principle (Williams 1999). 
The epistemic work towards interoperability and solidarity 
The same kind of reasoning could apply to the epistemic and technoscientific fabric of personalized 
medicine, and consequently to the critique Prainsack moves to the epistemic value of interoperability 
in personalized medicine. The visions of data-intensive, individualized medicine discussed by the 
author are in fact currently being translated into concrete technoscientific assemblages that are pivotal 
to the establishment of personalized medicine as translational research and biomedical practice in a 
given socio-political setting. In the Swiss case (Meier-Abt et al. 2015), for instance, we can also 
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underline the discursive investment of interoperable data infrastructures ((Swiss Personalized Health 
Network 2017) with a hyped enthusiasm. Building an infrastructure of interoperable datasets is 
perhaps the main declared objective of Swiss initiatives, which is presented as capable of allowing 
“the molecular analysis of samples, the sharing of data for a large population, the development of 
standardized bioinformatics tools […] and finally, the interpretation of these data enabling optimal 
therapeutic decision-making” (Coukos et al. 2014, p.1099). Yet, a closer look at the different research, 
translational and clinical endeavours involving actors in the Swiss biomedical community reveals 
how interoperable data infrastructures – more than constituting an object – should be regarded as an 
objective (cf. Guchet 2016) towards which these actors work by negotiating its experimental, 
technological, social, economic, legal and political facets. A few examples may be useful here to 
illustrate how interoperability of data in the infrastructures at the centre of this and similar endeavours 
constitute concrete elements of professional work towards the alignment of various technoscientific 
promises with medical reality. 
Driven by imperatives of research discoveries and the development of innovative therapeutics 
or biomarkers, those who have developed platforms of biobanking for sample storage and sharing 
(Mooser and Currat 2014) consider the integration of data as a fundamental resource to harness the 
potentialities of current biomedical technologies, and to streamline the research process of 
development for new preventive and therapeutic strategies. Without going as far as considering it 
capable to “yield meaningful, medically actionable information” (p.8) – something that Prainsack 
arguably underlines as being unwarranted – practicing the interoperability of patient health records 
and data produced through the analysis of biobanking samples is in this context building an 
environment for research towards personalized medicine. Interoperability means here establishing a 
convention of practices and norms (e.g. common ontology of different data, homogeneous consent 
standards, etc.) among citizen-donors and the community of clinician researchers. Differently from 
this example, interoperability is instead a matter of hermeneutics and interpretation for those working 
toward the development of bioinformatics tools for data analysis (Lescuyer, Hochstrasser, and 
Rabilloud 2007; Sansone et al. 2012). Rather than pointing to the relational function of interoperable 
biological data, in this concrete engagement with data integration what is at stake is the combination 
of different layers of biological data in a meaningful way. Bioinformatic interoperability of multi-
omic data – but also digital health data collected through technologies such as trackers, sensors, or 
wearables (see (Salathé et al. 2012; Lovis and James 2016; Trono 2016) – finds its rationale into the 
capacity to describe systems of interaction between biological phenomena of different nature. In this 
respect, the promises attached to the operationalization of interoperability seem to sketch a dynamic 
that is symmetrically different from the one we encountered in the example above. While in the first 
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case interoperability operates as an invisible, background feature of the research ecology pivoting 
around biobanking, here interoperable datasets are rather supposed to resurface systematically – or 
even automatically, if we take at face value the promissory rhetoric attached to artificial intelligence 
(Howard and Huber 2016) – as an informed grasp of the relevant property of biological systems and 
their variation from a statistical average.  
Needless to say, the questions of medical actionability of this information emphasized by 
Prainsack are yet another layer of complexity in the different pragmatic engagements with data 
interoperability we have briefly illustrated through the Swiss cases. However, what the examples 
above show is that building infrastructures for data-driven medicine is a layered, complex, and 
heterogeneous practice, which is informed by distinct epistemic and technoscientific ends, as well as 
visions as to why it is worth producing, pooling and implementing knowledge for the personalization 
of future medicine. A process that, as we have seen, gives shape to distinct pragmatic functions of 
interoperability, and that, we might add, is also likely to be thoroughly imbued with the subjective 
experimentations with the moral economy of personalized medicine highlighted in the previous 
section. This is the next (and last) piece of the jigsaw portrayed by Prainsack upon which we wish to 
elaborate. 
The epistemic engagements with interoperability and sharing of data can indeed be 
characterized also as a plurality of normative and value-laden engagements with the socio-political 
configurations of personalized medicine. Building an infrastructure of interoperable data is, in this 
vein, not just creating an ecosystem allowing researchers, patients and clinicians to pursue different 
epistemic objectives, but also an exercise of co-construction of the moral life of such infrastructures. 
One example – always drawn from our observations in the Swiss context – can illustrate these 
moments of co-production (Jasanoff 2004) in personalized medicine: the attempt to provide technical 
solutions to the ethical issues of privacy and re-identification in IT infrastructures of personalized 
data sharing. Current configurations of research, and the public debate (‘Génome chiffré, génome 
protégé’ 2017) around Swiss initiatives towards personalized health partly revolve in fact around the 
relevance and utility of strategies for the encryption of the data collected. Developing effective 
cryptography standards is, in this context, not just an engineering problem for the construction of 
informatics systems of data-sharing (Check Hayden 2015), but rather constitutes the opportunity to 
infuse the machinery of personalized medicine with values of “digital trust” and privacy-conscious 
technological standards (Barraud 2017). Striking the right balance between circulation of different 
data, minimization of risks for re-identification and prevention of breaches of access through a 
technical standard for data handling and sharing is, in other words, a way to promote trusted 
participation in this endeavour, and to prevent indiscreet access to these data by unwarranted actors. 
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Specifically, the interests of insurance companies and the reported cyber attacks to which healthcare 
institutions are subjected in the US (‘Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force - PHE’ 2018) 
provide, in the case at issue, a moral justification for developing robust encryption standards in 
interoperable data systems. In brief, pursuing the techno-epistemic objective of a secure and 
interoperable data infrastructure can reasonably be characterized as one facet of the moral work 
towards an equitable and privacy-promoting configuration of personalized medicine. 
The example of encryption shows therefore how developing interoperable data infrastructures 
means also aligning techno-epistemic standards with values of trust in the healthcare system and with 
the political struggles to prevent potential discrimination of patients and citizens. By ensuring that 
any illegitimate user of health data is kept out of the infrastructure, standards of encryption represent 
a resource for biomedical actors to sketch a specific social circulation of their work towards 
personalized medicine. And one, we argue, that could go in the direction of rendering solidaristic 
practices both a moral and a technoscientific condition of possibility of personalized medicine. The 
normative and technical imperative of cryptography could in fact arguably be seen as no less than 
one – limited, yet significant – strategy to ensure that openness of health data in the future of medicine 
does not undermine existing solidaristic structures in healthcare. In this respect, Prainsack’s critique 
of interoperability and data sharing in these endeavours is an important reminder of how “a critical 
examination of the assumptions and consequences of such an approach in medicine is an important 
task” (p.9). Yet, what our analysis has tried to show is that interoperability may not only be valuable 
to a pre-given and static rhetoric worth her critiques, but also may qualify as a symmetric and 
complementary practical engagement with the moral filigree of data-intensive and personalized 
medicine. Weaving the sociotechnical fabric of personalization in medicine does not rest solely on 
the problematic economy of values, norms and sentiments criticized by Prainsack. Rather, it is a 
practical process straddling the social and techno-epistemic value of this endeavour, and one that – 
in at least one telling example – displays material and technological experimentations that could be 
compatible with her call to promote solidarity in the social structure and power dynamics of medicine.  
Conclusions  
The contribution by Barbara Prainsack invites us to reflect upon the socio-political innovations that 
the normative exercises of solidarity could bring into the realization of personalized medicine. In the 
present commentary, we we have highlighted multiple ways in which solidaristic practices can 
already be observed in the unfolding of personalization in medicine both at the moral and epistemic 
level. In this respect, our analysis can be regarded as a complement to Prainsack’s critique of the 
moral economy of data-intensive and personalized medicine. Specifically, our work constitutes an 
invitation to consider the framework proposed by the author not just as a positive normative guidance 
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in the societal appraisal of socio-political initiatives towards personalized medicine. Rather, our focus 
on micro-level experimentations with personalization reveals how solidarity thinking qualifies also 
as productive methodological operator allowing to reconstruct how, amidst the yet indeterminate 
configurations of future medicine, its value is being negotiated in, and thus could flourish from the 
praxis of making personalized medicine a social reality. 
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